There are lies, damned lies and Romanticism: a classical approach to the problem of theoria by Templeton, Douglas
page 5
T
There are Lies, Damned Lies and 
Romanticism:
A Classical Approach to the Problem of 
Theoria	1
Douglas Templeton
In	 a	 railway	 station	 in	 the	 north	 of	 England,	 some	 years	 ago	 now,	
three	nuns	left	the	train	and	moved	towards	the	ticket	barrier,	feeling	
in	 the	 folds	 of	 their	 garments	 as	 they	 did	 so.	When	 they	 reached	
the barrier, the first nun said to the ticket collector: ‘We’re Sisters 
of	 John	 the	Baptist…’.	 ‘Well,	 there’s	 a	 bloody	 lie	 for	 a	 start’,	 said	
the	 ticket	 collector.	Had	 the	 ticket	 collector	 read	Sir	Walter	 Scott’s	
novel,	Redgauntlet,	Chapter	XIII,	he	would	have	said:	‘Tell	that	to	the	
marines	…’.
Now	 there	are	nuns	and	nuns	 (some	of	 them	singing)	and	 there	
are	 sisters	and	sisters	 (some	of	 them	blood-related).	And	both	nuns	
and	 sisters	–	 and	perhaps	 ticket	 collectors	–	 are	 capable	of	making	
category	mistakes.	
But	speaking	of	John	the	Baptist	prompts	me	to	say,	that,	if	you’re	
not	Socrates	and	you’re	not	dead,	then	you’re	probably	not	telling	the	
truth.
But	gestures,	too,	can	tell	lies	–	and	sometimes	lies	can	tell	the	truth.	
It	is	said	that	the	German	pastor	and	theologian,	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer,	
was,	 together	with	his	 friend	and	biographer,	Eberhard	Bethge,	at	a	
rally	where	Hitler,	the	Great	Dictator,	was	to	appear	and	to	speak.	As	
the rally began, Bethge turned to his friend and was astonished to find 
that	 his	 hand	was	 raised	 in	 an	 enthusiastic	Nazi	 salute.	Bonhoeffer	
turned	to	Bethge	and	said,	‘Put	up	your	hand,	you	fool.’	
Not	every	occasion	for	telling	the	truth	is	an	occasion	worth	dying	
for	–	 it	might	be	right	 to	resist	Adolf	Hitler,	but	maybe	not	right	 to	
resist	him	here	and	not	right	to	resist	him	now.
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Truth	and	the	lie:	‘‘What	is	truth?’	said	jesting	Pilate,	and	would	
not	stay	for	an	answer.’	In	the	novel,	The Master and Margarita,	by	
Mikhail	Bulgakov,	there	is	a	scene	in	which	Jesus	and	Pilate	confront	
one	another;	a	scene	in	which	(if	I	read	the	chapter	aright)	Pilate	does	
not	so	much	ask	Jesus,	 ‘What	 is	 truth?’	as	Jesus	ask	Pilate	what	he	
(Jesus)	can	best	do	for	him	(Pilate).	The	pressures	to	which	Pilate	is	
subject,	pressures	personal	and	political,	indicate	that	there	is	only	one	
way	that	Pilate	should	make	up	his	mind.	Jesus	is	not	there	to	protect	
himself.	He	is	there	to	see	what	he	can	do	for	Pilate.	‘Being	there	for	
others’	is	what	Jesus	is	there	for	–	and	what	anyone	is	anywhere	for.
And	the	rest	is	history;	or	something	not	altogether	unlike	it.	
Perhaps	the	truth	can	never	be	told.	Perhaps	what	is	said	can	never	
be	adequate;	perhaps	there	can	never	be	adequacy	between	intellectus 
and	rei, intellect	and	thing,	between	you	the	thinker	and	what	you	are	
thinking	about.
In	 what	 sense	 does	 the	 novelist	 tell	 the	 truth?	 In	 what	 sense	 does	
Goethe,	the	dramatist,	tell	the	truth?	Or	Goethe,	the	autobiographer	in	
his	autobiography?	How	do	Truth and Poetry 2 go	together?	
In	 Speculum Mentis, Or	 The Mirror of the Mind,3	 R.	 G.	
Collingwood	tells	us	that	the	artist	does	not	set	out	to	tell	 the	truth,	
nor,	for	that	matter,	to	tell	lies.	He	(or	she)	sets	out	simply	to	tell.	And	
to	tell	beautifully.	
But	that	is	early	Collingwood	(1924).	But	we	also	have	Outlines of 
a Philosophy of Art 4	(1925) and	The Principles of Art 5 (1938). There, 
especially	 in	The Principles of Art, we find that the business of the 
artist	is	the	imaginative	expression	of	emotion.	In	a	process	of	labour,	
of	parturition,	 the	artist	 struggles	 to	get	 something	off	his	 chest,	or	
her	bosom.	Insofar	as	the	expression	is	adequate,	it	is	true.	The	pen,	
the	brush,	the	chisel	have	moved	truly.	It	is	like,	for	the	philosopher,	
the	 solution	of	 a	philosophical	 problem,	 except	 that	 the	 task	of	 the	
philosopher	is	to	think,	while	the	task	of	the	philosophical	poet	is	to	
express	what	it	feels	like	to	think:	
The	poet	converts	human	experience	into	poetry	…	by	fusing	
thought	 itself	 into	 emotion	 …	 Thus	 Dante	 has	 fused	 the	
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Thomistic	philosophy	into	a	poem	expressing	what	it	feels	like	
to	be	a	Thomist.6	
However,	before	descending	into	hell,	or	passing	through	purgatory,	
or	rising	into	paradise,	we	must	stick	with	the	earth	a	little	longer.
Before	Margaret	Fuller	left	the	USA	for	England	and	the	Continent,	
where	she	would	seek	out	Wordsworth,	Carlyle,	George	Sand	and	the	
Brownings,	she	was	reported	to	have	said:	‘I	now	know	all	the	people	
worth knowing in America, and I find no intellect comparable to my 
own’.	To	this	should	be	added	the	well-known	story,	that,	when	it	was	
reported	to	Carlyle	that	she	had	said	that	she	had	decided	to	‘accept	
the	Universe’,	he	had	said:	‘Gad,	she’d	better!’
It	is	to	the	Universe	that	we	now	pass.
On	 these	our	Romantics,	 the	Universe	 implodes	–	 the	Universe,	
with	capital	U	–	or	 the	Universe	with	capital	W;	W,	 that	 is,	 for	 the	
Whole.	
Now	Ms	Fuller	and	Carlyle	are	not	alone.	Childe	Harold	belongs	
here,	too.	Byron	writes:
There	is	a	pleasure	in	the	pathless	woods,
There	is	a	rapture	on	the	lonely	shore,
There	is	society,	where	none	intrudes,
By	the	deep	sea,	and	music	in	its	roar:
I	love	not	man	the	less,	but	Nature	more,
From	these	our	interviews,	in	which	I	steal
From	all	I	may	be,	or	have	been	before,
To	mingle	with	the	Universe,	and	feel
What	I	can	ne’er	express,	yet	cannot	all	conceal.7	
In	 1799,	 Friedrich	 Schleiermacher	 (his	 name	 means	 ‘Veil	 Maker’	
–	aptly,	for	a	theologian)	wrote	On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured 
Despisers.8	Schleiermacher	became	known,	in	later	life,	for	the	notion	
of	[Schlechthinnige Abhängigkeit	or]	‘Absolute	Dependence’	(sc.	of	
humankind	on	God,	or	of	humankind	on	the	Universe	–	there	is	a	kind	
of	approximate	identity	between	the	two	terms:	God	and	Universe	–	
Schleiermacher and his circle were certainly influenced by Spinoza). 
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Hegel	was	 a	 philosopher	who	 said	many	 things,	 but	 one	 of	 the	
things	he	was	unkind	enough	to	say	was	that	this	notion	of	‘Absolute	
Dependence’	made	Schleiermacher’s	dog	a	better	theologian	than	his	
master.	But	this	book	of	Schleiermacher’s,	On Religion,	comes	near	
to	being	or	 is	 at	 least	one	 candidate	 for	being	 the	beginning	of	 the	
Romantic	movement	–	or	of	what	(see	below)	should	perhaps	rather	
be	called	the	Romantic	Revival Movement.
Meanwhile	 here	 are	 one	 or	 two	 examples	 of	 the	 use	 by	
Schleiermacher	of	the	word	‘Universe’.	They	come	from	the	sterling	
translation	of	Schleiermacher	by	that	sterling	Scot.	
The	 quotations	 are	 introduced	 by	 a	well-known	 quotation	 from	
Boswell’s Life of Johnson.	As	Johnson	was	once	 the	greatest	 living	
Englishman	(now	dead),	the	extract	can	bear	repetition:
After	we	[sc., Boswell	and	Johnson]	came	out	of	 the	church	
[this	was	in	Harwich,	England],	we	stood	talking	for	some	time	
together	of	Bishop	Berkeley’s	ingenious	sophistry	to	prove	the	
non-existence	of	matter,	and	 that	every	 thing	 in	 the	universe	
is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his 
doctrine	is	not	true,	it	 is	impossible	to	refute	it.	I	shall	never	
forget	the	alacrity	with	which	Johnson	answered,	striking	his	
foot	with	mighty	force	against	a	large	stone,	till	he	rebounded	
from	it,	“I	refute	it	thus.”	9	
(The definition of ‘rebound’, in Johnson’s Dictionary,	is	as	follows:	
‘to fly back in consequence of motion impressed and resisted by a 
greater	power’	–	Johnson	was,	after	all,	dealing	with	the	reality	of	a	
portion	of	the	universe	–	and	with	Bishop	Berkeley.)	
Schleiermacher	 belonged	 to	 a	 Berlin	 Wednesday	 Club,10	 a	
club	 to	 which	 ‘everyone’	 belonged	 –	 everyone,	 who	 was	 anyone,	
everyone,	who	was	 a	Romanticist,	 everyone,	 if	 you	were	Schlegel,	
the	 translator,	 or	Schlegel	 (Junior),	 [Friedrich],	 both	of	 them	 ‘great	
theorists	of	romanticism’;11or	if	you	were	Tieck,	story-teller	and	poet,	
or	Wackenroder,	 who	wrote	 in	 the	 1790s	 that	music	 ‘shows	 us	 all	
the	movements	of	our	spirit,	disembodied’;12	or	 (lastly)	 if	you	were	
‘that	divine	youth	who	too	early	fell	asleep,	to	whom	all	that	his	spirit	
touched	 became	 immediately	 a	 great	 poem’,13	 if	 you	were,	 that	 is:	
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Georg	Friedrich	Philipp	von	Hardenberg,	alias Novalis	(which	means	
‘pathfinder’, or ‘pioneer’).
‘The	 true	 intellectual	 father’	 of	 this	 ‘Romantic	 School’	 writes	
Oman,	‘was	Goethe,	and	his	Wilhelm	Meister	was	 their	 ideal.’	And	
Oman	goes	on:
The	 germ	 of	 much	 of	 Schleiermacher’s	 thought	 is	 here—!	
[in	 this	 Romantic	 School]	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 individual,	
the	place	of	intuition,	everything	a	revelation	of	the	Universe	
[again,	the	capital	U],	the	Universe	itself	one	glorious,	eternally	
active	whole.
What	 with	 Goethe	 was	 art	 with	 the	 younger	 generation	
was	 criticism.	By	 critical	 resolve	 they	 determined	 to	 be	 the	
uncritical	Æolian	harp	of	every	feeling.14	
But	what,	we	might	ask,	is	it	to	be,	or	to	become	‘by	critical	resolve	
…	the	uncritical	Aeolian	harp	of	every	feeling’?	Aeolus,	the	ruler	of	
the	winds,	 lived	on	an	eponymous	 island;	 and	 the	eponymous	harp	
was	a	box	with	strings	across	it,	which	made	musical	or	quasi-musical	
sounds,	when	the	wind	blew	over	it.	What	Homer	tells	us	is	this:
[Aeolus’]	 twelve	 children	 too	 abide	 there	 in	 his	 halls,	 six	
daughters	and	six	lusty	sons;	and,	behold,	he	gave	his	daughters	
to	his	sons	to	wife.	And	they	feast	evermore	by	their	dear	father	
and	their	kind	mother	…15
Rose’s	 Handbook of Greek Mythology offers	 here	 a	 brief	 note:	
‘Od., X,	 I	 foll.,	where	 no	 one	 is	 in	 the	 least	 shocked	 at	 the	 family	
arrangements.’	
But,	 however	 these	 arrangements	 may	 have	 been,	 to	 say	 that	
the	Wednesday	 Club	 was	 ‘by	 critical	 resolve	…	 determined	 to	 be	
the	uncritical	Aeolian	harp	of	every	feeling’	is	tantamount	to	saying	
that	with	 this	Romantic	 group	we	 are	 dealing	with	 a	 rebirth	 of	 the	
imagination.	 Through	 religion,	 says	 Schleiermacher,	 ‘the	 universal	
existence of all finite things in the Infinite lives immediately in us.’ 
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‘[R]eligion,’ he says, ‘is sense and taste for the Infinite.’	16	Or	again:
[The phenomenon of your life] is fleeting and transparent as 
the	vapour	which	the	dew	breathes	on	blossom	and	fruit,	it	is	
bashful	 and	 tender	 as	 a	maiden’s	kiss,	 it	 is	 holy	 and	 fruitful	
as	a	bridal	embrace	…	It	is	the	holy	wedlock	of	the	Universe	
with	 the	 incarnated	 Reason	 for	 a	 creative	 and	 productive	
embrace.17
And	somewhere,	behind	all	this,	no	doubt,	lies	the	‘God-intoxicated	
man’	[der Gott-betrunkener Mensch],	as	Novalis	is	said	to	have	called	
Spinoza.	
In	 his	 autobiography:	 Truth and Poetry,	 Goethe	 has	 the	 following	
passage	on	Hamann	and	action.	It	goes	like	this:
The	 principle	 to	 which	 all	 of	 Hamann’s	 expressions	 can	 be	
reduced	is	this.	“All	that	man	undertakes	to	perform,	whether	
by	deed	or	word,	or	otherwise,	must	come	from	all	his	powers	
united; everything individual, dismembered, is worthless.” A 
splendid	maxim!	but	hard	to	follow.18
According	 (I	 think)	 to	 Paul	 Valéry,	 thinking	 is	 like	 walking;	 a	
perpetual	move	from	one	point	of	imbalance	to	another,	much	as	by	
Collingwood’s “Theory of the Forms of Error”,19	thought	advances	by	
the	correction	of	corrections	by	correction.
Thinking	is,	like	Rodin’s	Penseur,	a	muscular	activity.	So	too	the	
expression	of	thought,	of	thought	and	emotion:	‘Poetry,’	says	Hamann,	
‘is	the	mother-tongue	of	the	human	race’.20	
And	 Collingwood	 21	 expands	 Hamann	 here:	 ‘Every	 kind	 of	
language’,	he	says,	‘is	…	a	specialized	form	of	bodily	gesture,	and	in	
this	sense	it	may	be	said	that	the	dance	is	the	mother	of	all	languages.’	
Collingwood,	that	is,	expands	from	tongue	to	body,	to	the	whole	body	
as	an	expressive	unit.
If	all	reality	can	be	divided	into	two	parts	or	attributes;	divided	(so	
Spinoza)	into	mind	and	body,	it	is	clear	that	language	to	do	with	the	
mind	is	inter-penetrated	by	language	that	has	to	do	with	the	body,	with	
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the	extension	of	matter.	A	classic	study	is	R.	B.	Onians:	The Origins 
of European Thought.22
The	 word	 phren (s.v. Liddell and Scott) produces meaning 3: 
‘mind’,	meaning	2:	‘heart’,	and	meaning	1:	‘midriff’.	From	phren we	
get ‘phrenology’: the study of the brain, its surface and configuration. 
‘Midriff’	means	the	‘middle	of	the	hrif’’	(Old	English)	–	the	hrif is	the	
‘belly’.	
When Odysseus arrives home and finds that others have arrived 
home	too,	the	narrator	comments:	
…	 even	 as	 a	 bitch	 stands	 over	 her	 tender	whelps	 growling,	
when	she	spies	a	man	she	knows	not,	and	she	is	eager	to	assail	
him,	so	growled	his	heart	within	him	in	his	wrath	at	their	evil	
deeds.	Then	 he	 smote	 upon	 his	 breast	 and	 rebuked	 his	 own	
heart,	saying:
‘Endure,	my	heart;	yea,	a	baser	thing	thou	once	didst	bear	…23
An	essential	concern	of	Romance	and	Romanticism	is	the	‘heart’.	But	
‘heart’	is	also	linked	to	‘head’.	And	‘thought’	to	‘thought’.	
Take the word: ‘reflect’. By etymology it goes back from the Latin 
flecto to	‘bend’	to	the	Greek	word	pholkos,	which	means	(probably)	
‘bandy-legged’	and	to	another	related	word	phalkes,	which	means	‘the	
bent	 rib	 of	 a	 ship’;	 and	 then	goes	 forward	 again	 to	 the	Latin	word	
falco,	‘a	falcon’,	with	its	curved	claws	and	beak	–	and	perhaps	also	to	
falx which	means	‘sickle’	or	‘pruning-hook’.	
Reflection, that is, is the bending back of thought upon itself, to 
see	whether	that	thinking	has	or	has	not	been	well	and	truly	done.
But to return, briefly, to Hamann.
Of	 the	 sensitive	 and	 complex	matter	 of	Hamann’s	 ‘marriage	 of	
conscience’	(Gewissensehe),	Gregor	Smith	says	the	following:
About	the	same	time	as	Herder	came	to	Königsberg,	the	second	
of the two new figures began to dominate Hamann’s passions. 
This	was	Anna	Regina	 Schumacher,	 a	 peasant	 girl	who	 had	
entered	[Hamann’s]	father’s	household	at	Easter	1762	…	She	
page 5
was	twenty-four,	and,	as	Hamann	later	described	her,	“of	full-
blooded	and	blooming	health,	and	a	just	as	robust	and	stupid	
honesty and stedfastness”	24
To Nicolai, one of the leading figures of the Enlightenment in Berlin, 
Hamann	wrote	 of	 ‘a	 left-handed	marriage’	with	Anna	Regina;	 and,	
to Herder, that there was to be no official marriage, ‘“not because 
I	am	 too	proud,	 for	 I	 am	 too	 thankful,	but	because	 I	am	convinced	
that this situation [marriage] would lessen her own happiness …” 
…	Hamann	feared	that	…	(t)he	reality	of	marriage	…	could	only	be	
preserved	in	circumstances	which	did	not	permit	the	intrusion	of	civil	
and	ecclesiastical	forms’.25
The	whole	question	of	sexuality	was	not	a	question	that	Hamann	
avoided.	According	 to	Martin	Seils	 it	 ‘constitutes	 the	basic	element	
of	life	(sexus)	and	language	(genus)’	[das Grundelement des Lebens 
(sexus) und der Sprache (genus) bildet].26	 And	 the	 Magus	 of	 the	
North,	 furthermore,	gives	himself	 to	extended	lallation,	 to	extended	
glossolalia on the ‘rhapsody of fig-leaves’ of Adam and Eve.
And	 Hamann	 quotes,	 for	 example,	 Manilius	 Astronomy Bk	
IV:	 ‘Everyone	 is	 a	 representation	 of	 God,	 in	 a	 miniature	 image’	
[Exemplumque DEI quisque est in imagine parva].	For	Hamann,	the	
language	of	which	mankind	is	in	search	can	be	found	everywhere	–	in	
the	Bible,	 of	 course,	 but	 not	 only	 there,	 but	 throughout	 nature	 and	
history.
‘There	is	one	man,’	writes	Isaiah	Berlin	(and	he	means	Hamann),	
‘who	in	my	view,	struck	the	most	violent	blow	against	the	Enlightenment	
and	began	the	whole	romantic	process	…	[His]	fundamental	doctrine	
was	 that	God	was	not	 a	 geometer,	 not	 a	mathematician,	 but	 a	 poet	
…’.27 The first three words of the Septuagint are these: en arche(i) 
epoiese,	‘In	the	beginning	he	made…	epoiese means:	‘he	made’.	And	
poiesis means	‘poetry’.	Poetry	is	par excellence God’s	business.
The	 movement	 of	 which	 Schleiermacher	 and	 Hamann	 were	 major	
figures was called Romantic, because it stemmed ultimately from 
the	 language	 of	 the	 Romans,	 as	 that	 language	 had	 developed	 into	
Languedoc	and	Provençal	and	Occitan	in	the	period	from	the	eleventh	
to	the	thirteenth	centuries.	Romance	was	the	language	that	they	spoke.	
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And	 romance	 was	 what	 they	 got	 up	 to.	 Bernart	 de	Ventadour,	 for	
example,	writes	in	his	Languedoc	or	Provençal	tongue;	and	he	says:
La	dousa	votz	ai	auzida
del	rosinholet	sauvatge,
et	es	m’ins	el	cor	salhida	…
I	have	heard	the	sweet	voice	
of	the	nightingale	in	the	woods	
and	it	has	pierced	to	the	depths	of	my	heart	…
[and	the	poem	continues:]	
Every	man	who	does	not	dwell	in	a	state	of	joy	
and	does	not	direct	his	heart	and	his	desire	
towards	love,	leads	a	base	life	…28	
In	these	troubadours Gregor	Smith29	sees	a	sign	of	major	developments	
to	come,	of	the	process	of	secularization,	of	the	emergence	of	mankind,	
autonomous	and	free	–	and	together	with	all	that,	an	invitation	to	the	
proper	validation	of	the	earth.	Within	history,	Gregor	Smith	thought,	
and	 thought	 that	 the	Troubadours	were	beginning	 to	 think	–	within	
history	and nowhere else was	real	life	to	be	found.	
And	next,	chronologically,	after	the	Troubadours,	we	get	the	Chanson 
de Geste	 (early	 twelfth	 century),	 the	 Song	 of	 Roland,	 who	 along	
with	 Oliver	 and	 ten	 Paladins	 perished	 in	 their	 attempt	 to	 defend	
Charlemagne’s	rearguard	–	fading	at	Roncesvalles	on	the	blowing	of	
a	horn.
And	next	again,	the	Arthurian	Romances	of	Chrétien	de	Troyes	(in	
the	second	half	of	the	twelfth	century)	and	some	lines	(II.175	ff.)	from	
Yvain by	Chrétien	de	Troyes,	which	are	included	in	Erich	Auerbach’s	
Mimesis,	 his classic	 account	 of	 The Representation of Reality in 
Western Literature:
Il avint, pres de set anz
Que je seus come païsanz
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Aloie querant avantures,
Armez de totes armeüres
Si come chevaliers doit ester…
It	happened	seven	years	ago	
that,	lonely	as	a	countryman,	
I	was	making	my	way	in	search	of	adventures,	
fully	armed	
as	a	knight	should	be	…30	
In	his	biography	of	Coleridge,	Richard	Holmes	has	occasion	to	quote	
from	one	of	his	letters:
Should	children	be	permitted	to	read	Romances,	and	
Relations	of	Giants	&	Magicians,	&	Genii?	–	I	know	all	that	
has	been	said	against	it;	but	I	have	formed	my	faith	in	the	
affirmative. I know no other way of giving the mind a love of 
“the Great” and “the Whole” …31
This	remark	of	Coleridge	is	just	another	reminder,	if	we	need	one,	that	
what	we	are	dealing	with	is	not	simply	the	Romantic	movement,	but	
the	Romantic	Revival	movement.	And	Sir	Walter	Scott	belongs	here	
too,	for	he	betrays	his	debt	to	these	earlier	movements,	of	which	the	
Arthurian	Romances	are,	perhaps,	 the	paradigm,	 in	his	contribution	
to	The	Supplement	to	the	Encyclopaedia Britannica	(1818),	of	three	
Essays – the first on Chivalry, the	second	on	Romance, and	the	third	
on Drama.32
Coleridge	and	Scott,	that	is,	have	been	walking	in	the	footsteps	of	
the	Troubadours	and	have	been	embroiled	 in	 the	 loves	and	hates	of	
King Arthur’s Court. It is immeasurable, infinite love that makes both 
worlds go round: the world, first, of medieval romance and, second, 
the	world	of	the	eighteenth-	and	nineteenth-century	romantic	revival.	
And	in	The Heart of Midlothian (Chapter	XLII,	at	 the	beginning	in	
the first paragraph) Scott betrays his awareness of the tradition within 
which	he	is	working,	when	he	writes:	‘Arran,	a	mountainous	region,	
or	Alpine	island,	abounds	with	the	grandest	and	most	romantic	[sic!]	
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scenery …’ In writing a romance, he finds it necessary to use the 
adjective	‘romantic’.
But the Romantic Movement of, say, 1770–1830 is no mere revival! 
In	his	assessment	of	 this Movement,	 Isaiah	Berlin	 is	very	bold.	He	
says,	in	the	beginning:
The	importance	of	romanticism	is	that	it	 is	 the	largest	recent	
movement	to	transform	the	lives	and	the	thought	of	the	Western	
world.	 It	 seems	 to	 me	 to	 be	 the	 greatest	 single	 shift	 in	 the	
consciousness	of	the	West	that	has	occurred,	and	all	the	other	
shifts	which	have	occurred	in	the	course	of	the	nineteenth	and	
twentieth	centuries	appear	to	me	in	comparison	less	important,	
and at any rate deeply influenced by it.
And	towards	the	end:	
You	create	values,	 you	create	goals,	 you	create	 ends,	 and	 in	
the	end	you	create	your	own	vision	of	the	universe,	exactly	as	
artists	create	works	of	art	…32
And	he	says	this:
[T]here	is	no	structure	of	things.	There	is	no	pattern	to	which	
you must adapt yourself. There is only, if not the flow, the 
endless	self-creativity	of	the	universe.33
The	reader	so	far	has	not	had,	or	not	precisely	had,	a	Spinozistic	series	
of	 propositions	 demonstrated	 in	 geometrical	 order	 (Ethica ordine 
geometrico demonstrata),	 but	 something	 very	 much	 more	 like	 the	
following	short	extract	from	Collingwood’s	Essay on Metaphysics:
In unscientific thinking our thoughts are coagulated into knots 
and tangles; we fish up a thought out of our minds like an 
anchor	foul	of	its	own	cable,	hanging	upside-down	and	draped	
in seaweed with shell-fish sticking to it, and dump the whole 
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thing	on	deck	quite	pleased	with	ourselves	for	having	got	it	up	
at	all.34
Nevertheless,	a	concluding	attempt	must	now	be	made	to	provide	a	dos 
moi pou sto	(‘Give	me	a	place	to	stand’)	–	or	rather	(with	Simplicius	in	
his	Physics)	a	pa(i) bo kai kino tan gan (a	‘Where	am	I	to	go	and	move	
the	earth?’).	There	is	perhaps	just	a	space	to	provide,	not	a	catena,	but	
some	loose	links.
In	 the	 Inferno, IV.131, Dante speaks of il maestro di color che 
sanno,	‘the	Master	of	those	who	know’.	
Finding a place to stand, or finding a platform as a preliminary to 
engaging	in	movement,	on	a	great	white	horse	like	Sir	Walter	Scott,	
being	chivalrous	and	romantic	and,	perhaps,	too,	dramatic	–	all	that	is	
very	necessary	at	a	time	when	not	all	truths	are	convenient,	when	what	
is	required	is	the	moral	equivalent	of	war.
But	if	you’ve	had	an	allusion	to	one	President	more	or	less,	you	
might	as	well	have	two	or	three	more,	in	one	way	or	another.	We	can	
do	without:	‘Ich bin ein Berliner’,	but	we	can	do	with	a	different	John	
Kennedy	sentence:	‘Our	problems	are	man-made,	therefore	they	can	
be	solved	by	man	…’.	Who	 the	 third	 is,	 I	 think	 I	need	not	 tell	 this	
audience: ‘Let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to 
fear	is	the	fear	of	fear	itself.’	
You’ve	had	one	clue	already	from	Spinoza’s	amor Dei intellectualis.	
And	you’ve	had	Madeleine	Bassett	on	‘the	stars	as	God’s	daisy-chain’.	
But	my	title	included,	advisedly,	the	word	‘classical’,	and	that	entitles	
me	to	turn	to	‘the	Master	of	those	who	know’.
Aristotle	has	three	terms	or	formulations.	He	speaks	of	‘the	[books]	
next	 after	 the	 Physics’,	 of	 ‘First	 Philosophy’,	 and	 of	 ‘Theology’	
(theologike).	And	 to	 these	may	 be	 added	 ‘Wisdom’,	 or	Sophia.	He	
writes	in	an	extremely	spare,	sparse	or	lapidary	style.	On	Aristotle,	in	
his	contrast	with	Plato,	the	literary	critic,	F.	L.	Lucas	says	this:	
It	 remains,	 to	me	 at	 least,	 an	 enormous	 relief	 to	 come	 back	
from	Plato	to	common	sense	–	even	that	somewhat	prosaic	and	
pachydermatous	common	sense	which	may	at	moments	give	
the	reader	of	Aristotle	a	vision	of	a	very	large	and	sagacious	
elephant	picking	up	very	small	pins.35	
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One	of	these	small	pins	is	God,	who	or	which,	for	Aristotle	(according	
to	T.	S.	Eliot’s	teacher,	Joachim)	is	‘the	only	form	without	matter’.36	
Such	a	god,	to	Spinoza,	of	course,	would	simply	not	matter,	would,	
that	 is,	simply	not	exist,	as	being	without	 the	essential	or	necessary	
attribute	of	extension.
Most	 thinkers	 are	 agreed	 that	 the	 shape,	 dimension	 and	
characteristics	(and	perhaps	numerical	quantity)	of	the	Deity	is	a	puzzle	
or	a	mystery.	The	Christian	myth	is	very	commonly	boiled	down	to	
what	Collingwood	would	call	three	‘absolute	presuppositions’,	namely:	
incarnation	 (or	 embodiment	 in	 a	 person	 or	 persons	 or	 all	 persons),	
crucifixion (or agony and death, to which all persons are in some sort 
subject),	and	lastly	resurrection	(or	awakening,	or	immortality).37	Or	
one might simply speak of affirmation, negation, and super-affirmation, 
perhaps	of	a	romantic,	or	even	romanticist	kind.
One of	the	things	that	Aristotle	speaks	about	is	enjoyment	and	the	
‘apolaustic’.	To	these	should	be	added,	of	course,	the	Shir haShirim,	
what	 Dietrich	 Bonhoeffer	 and	 Eberhard	 Bethge	 have	 to	 say	 about	
hilaritas and	the	question	that	Collingwood	puts	in	Speculum Mentis:
How	would	you	like	to	enjoy	for	ever	what	in	the	highest	art	
you	glimpse,	half-concealed	in	the	torrent	of	sensation? 38	
To which Bultmann’s imperative may finally, may eschatologically 
be	added:
In	 every	 moment	 slumbers	 the	 possibility	 of	 being	 the	
eschatological	moment.	You	must	awaken	it.39
Let	the	conclusion	be	English:	
For	I	that	am	lord	of	lif,	love	is	my	drynke,
And	for	that	drynke	today,	I	deide	upon	erthe.
I	faught	so,	me	thursteth	yet,	for	mannes	soule	sake;
May	no	drynke	me	moiste,	ne	my	thurst	slake,
Til	the	vendage	falle	in	the	vale	of	Josaphat,
That	I	drynke	right	ripe	must,	resureccio mortuorum.
And	thanne	shal	I	come	as	a	kyng,	crouned,	with	aungeles,
And	have	out	of	helle	alle	mennes	soules.40	
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